Social rationalizability by Herings, P.J.J. et al.
  
 
Social rationalizability
Citation for published version (APA):
Herings, P. J. J., Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2000). Social rationalizability. (METEOR research
memorandum; No. 017). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2000
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Social Rationalizability

P. Jean-Jacques Herings
1
, Ana Mauleon
2
and Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
3
1
Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, The Netherlands
(e-mail: P.Herings@algec.unimaas.nl)
2
Department of Economic Analysis, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Spain
(e-mail: jepmaeca@bs.ehu.es)
3
THEMA, University of Cergy Pontoise, France
(e-mail: Vincent.Vannetelbosch@eco.u-cergy.fr)
Date: April 2000
Summary. Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how
groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyse both non-
cooperative and cooperative games. We identify a number of shortcomings of existing solution
concepts that are used for social environments and propose a new concept called social ratio-
nalizability. The concept aims to identify the consequences of common knowledge of rationality
and farsightedness within the framework of social environments. The set of socially rationaliz-
able outcomes is shown to be non-empty for all social environments and it can be computed by
an iterative reduction procedure. We introduce a denition of coalitional rationality for social
environments and show that it is satised by social rationalizability.
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1 Introduction
Many social, economic and political activities are conducted by groups or coalitions of individ-
uals. For example, consumption takes place within households or families; production is carried
out by rms which are large coalitions of owners of dierent factors of production; workers
are organized in trade unions or professional associations; public goods are produced within a
complex coalition structure of federal, state, and local jurisdictions; political life is conducted
through political parties and interest groups; and individuals belong to networks of formal and
informal social clubs.
The framework of social environments as introduced in Chwe [4] (see also Rosenthal [9])
species what each coalition can do if and when it forms. It is general enough to integrate the
representation of a cooperative game, an extensive-form game with perfect information, and a
normal-form game played in such a fashion that there are coalitional moves and countermoves.
An example is the coalitional contingent threat situation due to Greenberg [5]. For social
environments where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agreements and actions
are public, Chwe [4] and Xue [14] have proposed the solution concepts of the largest consistent
set and the optimistic or conservative stable standards of behavior, respectively. The solution
concepts predict which coalitions structures are possibly stable and could emerge.
1
Both approaches have a number of nice features. Firstly, they do not rely on a very detailed
description of the coalition formation process as noncooperative sequential games do, see e.g.
Bloch [3].
2
No commitment assumption is imposed. Secondly, it incorporates the farsightedness
of the coalitions. A coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might
react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on without limit. The main dierence between
Chwe [4] and Xue [14] is that Xue's approach strengthens the farsightedness notion. A farsighted
individual considers only the nal outcomes that might result when making choices. But, an
individual with perfect foresight considers also how nal outcomes can be reached. That is,
possible deviations along the way to the nal outcomes should be considered.
3
1
For a very specic social environment, namely the coalitional contingent threat situation, Mariotti [7] has
dened an equilibrium concept: the coalitional equilibrium. Central to his concept is the notion of coalitional
strategies and the similarity with subgame perfection (except that coalitions are formally treated as players).
2
Sequential coalition formation games are quite sensitive to the exact coalition formation process and rely
on the commitment assumption. Once some individuals have agreed to form a coalition they are committed to
remain in that coalition. They can neither leave the coalition nor propose to change it later on.
3
In Chwe [4] the specication of how individuals view and use their alternatives is formalized by the indirect
dominance relation which captures some farsightedness of the individuals. In Xue [14] it is formalized by means
of the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg [5]. A social situation allows to capture perfect foresight
(which strengthens farsightedness) by extending the von Neumann and Morgenstern [13] notion of stability to
accommodate dierent behavior on the part of the individuals in terms of their Knightian (pessimism or optimism)
attitude towards uncertainty.
1
Both approaches suer from a number of drawbacks as well, some of them pointed out by
the authors themselves. For instance, as indicated in Chwe [4], the largest consistent set may
fail to satisfy the requirement of individual rationality. An individual that is given the choice
between two moves, where one yields with certainty a higher payo than the other, might choose
the move leading to the lower payo according to the largest consistent set. This is perhaps
somewhat less disturbing than it seems at rst sight, since the largest consistent set aims to be
a weak concept, a concept that rules out with condence. It is therefore more surprising, as
we show in this paper, that in certain social environments the largest consistent set may rule
out too much. One drawback of both the optimistic and the conservative stable standards of
behavior of Xue [14], is that both solution sets may be empty. This is worrisome as the idea of
farsightedness suggests that since coalitions do take into account the far reaching consequences
of their moves, they should be able to settle on some stable outcomes at least. We also present
a number of examples where the stable standards of behavior lead to undesirable outcomes, for
instance that both OSSB and even CSSB may rule out too little, or even worse, too much.
We aim for a solution concept that identies the consequences of common knowledge of
rationality and farsightedness within the framework of social environments, and that remedies
the problems mentioned above. To achieve this goal, we propose to extend the rationalizability
approach of Bernheim [2] and Pearce [8] to the framework of social environments. We use a
cautious version of rationalizability that is also analyzed in Herings and Vannetelbosch [6]. Since
social environments deal with the behavior of coalitions, whereas rationalizability is about the
implications of rationality of individuals, we have to convert coalitional behavior into individual
behavior. This is achieved by recognizing that individual participation in a coalition is basically
characterized by two possibilities. An individual may either agree to a coalitional move, or
object to it and block it. Unlike in non-cooperative game theory, in a social environment several
coalitions may and could be willing to move at the same time. Conicts of interest may arise,
which can take the form of one coalition trying to preempt the move of another coalition, but
also of coordination problems in and between coalitions. Individuals should therefore also have
beliefs on how such conicts of interest are solved.
The equilibrium approach assumes that individuals have common expectations about their
behaviors. That is, each individual holds a correct conjecture about the behavior of every other
individual. But once we admit the possibility that an individual may have several behaviors
that she could reasonably take, conjectures and behaviors actually played may be mismatched.
This is what distinguishes the rationalizability approach from the equilibrium one. Indeed,
in the rationalizability approach, the conjectures are not assumed to be correct, but are only
constrained by considerations of rationality. Each individual believes that the behavior taken
by every other individual is a best response to some conjecture on every other individual's
2
behavior, and, further, each individual assumes that every other individual reasons in this way
and hence thinks that every other individual believes that every other individual's behavior is
a best response to some conjecture, and so on. In other words, the individual rationality of the
individuals is common knowledge.
We introduce two alternative denitions of the social rationalizability concept which we show
to be equivalent denitions. The rst one is strongly inuenced by Battigalli's [1] extensive-form
rationalizability. It is based on two assumptions: (1) the individuals are rational and endowed
with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo.
Central to our new concept are the notions of individual behavior and of implementability prior-
belief. An individual behavior describes, for each history, the coalitional moves the individual
agrees to join and those she decides to block. Beliefs about which agreement is implemented
among the set of agreements are derived from an implementability prior-belief over the entire
set of feasible moves. Our second denition is motivated by Pearce's [8] original extensive-form
rationalizability and is based on a reduction procedure.
4
We show the equivalence of our two
denitions of social rationalizability.
Our main results are the following. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes is non-
empty for the entire class of social environments. When we apply social rationalizability to
the prisoner's dilemma, it follows that cooperation is sustained. Social environments deal with
coalitional moves. It is therefore important that social rationalizability not only guarantees
individual rationality, but also coalitional rationality. Among a set of Pareto ranked alternatives
a coalition should be able to coordinate on the Pareto optimal one. Social rationalizability is
shown to satisfy coalitional rationality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and primitives.
We present the solution concepts of Chwe [4] and Xue [14], and we give the motivation for
introducing a new concept. In Section 3 we propose two alternative denitions of social ratio-
nalizability and we show the equivalence of both of them. The examples are reconsidered and
solved by our concept. In Section 4 we study the property of coalitional rationality and show it
is satised by social rationalizability. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
4
Other papers related to extensive-form rationalizability (EFR) are among others Bernheim [2], who introduced
subgame-perfect rationalizability, Shimoji and Watson [10], who studied the equivalence between conditional
dominance and EFR, and Vannetelbosch [11],[12], who dened rationalizability for multi-stage bargaining games.
3
2 Social Environments
2.1 Notations and Primitives
As in Chwe [4] and Xue [14], we dene by   =


I; Z; (u
i
)
i2I
; f!
S
g
SI;S 6=;

a social environment,
where I = f1; 2; :::;#Ig is the set of individuals, Z is the nite set of outcomes, f!
S
g
SI;S 6=;
are eectiveness relations dened on Z, and for every individual i 2 I, u
i
: Z ! R is her utility
function. We denote by #I the cardinality of I. The relation !
S
represents what coalition S
can do: x
0
!
S
x
1
means that if x
0
is the status-quo, coalition S can make x
1
the new status-quo.
It does not mean that coalition S can enforce x
1
no matter what anyone else does; after S moves
to x
1
from x
0
, another coalition S
0
might move to x
2
, where x
1
!
S
0
x
2
. A priori no restrictions
are imposed on the eectiveness relations f!
S
g
SI;S 6=;
. For example, the eectiveness relation
can be empty, x
0
!
S
x
0
might be possible, and x
0
!
S
x
1
does not imply x
1
!
S
x
0
. All actions
or moves are public and the individuals care only about the end outcome, not how it is reached.
Conventional game theoretic situations can be modeled as a social environment.
 For noncooperative games in normal-form there are at least two possibilities for represen-
tation, depending on whether coalitions may form or not. Let Z
i
denote the nonempty set
of pure strategies of individual i: In the rst case, Z =
Q
i2I
Z
i
and x!
S
y if x
InS
= y
InS
.
In the second case, Z =
Q
i2I
Z
i
and x!
S
y if S = fig and x
Infig
= y
Infig
.
 For a cooperative TU-game (v; I); where the payo of the grand coalition has been
normalized to v(I) = 1 and the payos of one-player coalitions to v(fig) = 0; we set
Z = fx 2 R
#I
j
P
#I
i=1
x
i
= 1 and x
i
 0; 8i 2 Ig and x !
S
y if
P
i2S
y
i
 v(S): By
restricting attention to integer payos, it is easy to incorporate the existence of a smallest
money unit and to get a nite set of outcomes. For a cooperative NTU-game (v; I); we
put Z = fx 2 R
#I
j x 2 v(I) and x
i
individual rationalg and x!
S
y if y
S
2 v(S).
For social environments where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agree-
ments and actions are public, Chwe [4] and Xue [14] have proposed interesting concepts, the
largest consistent set and the optimistic or conservative stable standards of behavior, respec-
tively, to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable or could emerge.
2.2 The Largest Consistent Set
Based on the indirect dominance relation, Chwe [4] dened the largest consistent set (LCS).
The indirect dominance relation captures the fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end
outcome that their move(s) eventually may lead to. Moreover, a coalition may deviate from
a status quo only if each of its members can be made strictly better o. So, an outcome y
indirectly dominates x if y can replace x in a sequence of moves, such that at each move all
4
deviators are better o at the end outcome y compared to the status-quo they face. Formally,
indirect dominance is dened as follows.
An outcome x is indirectly dominated by y, or x y, if there exists a sequence x
0
; x
1
; :::; x
m
;
where x
0
= x and x
m
= y, and a sequence S
0
; S
1
; :::; S
m 1
such that x
j
!
S
j
x
j+1
and u
i
(x
j
) <
u
i
(y) 8 i 2 S
j
, for j = 0; 1; ::;m   1. Direct strict dominance is obtained by setting m = 1. An
outcome x is directly dominated by y, or x < y, if there exists a coalition S such that x !
S
y
and u
i
(x) < u
i
(y) 8 i 2 S. Obviously, if x < y, then x y. The largest consistent set, LCS ( ),
is dened as follows.
Denition 1 (Chwe, 1994) A set Y  Z is consistent if x 2 Y if and only if 8 y; S such that
x!
S
y, 9 z 2 Y , where y = z or y  z, such that we do not have u
i
(x) < u
i
(z) for all i 2 S.
The largest consistent set LCS ( ) is the consistent set such that if Y  Z is consistent then
Y  LCS ( ).
By considering indirect dominance, the largest consistent set captures the notion of farsight-
edness. An outcome is stable, that is an outcome is in the largest consistent set, if and only if
deviations from it do not occur because the deviation itself or potential further deviations are
not unanimously preferred to the original outcome by the coalition considering the deviation.
Although there can be many consistent sets, Chwe [4] has shown that there uniquely exists a
largest consistent set, LCS ( ) ; and that the largest consistent set is non-empty. One simple
way to nd LCS ( ) is to apply the following iterative procedure. Let Y
0
 Z. Then, Y
k
(k = 1; 2; :::) is inductively obtained as follows: x 2 Z belongs to Y
k
if and only if 8 y; S such
that x!
S
y, 9 z 2 Y
k 1
, where y = z or y  z; such that we do not have u
i
(x) < u
i
(z) for all
i 2 S. Then, LCS ( ) is
T
k1
Y
k
.
2.3 Stable Standards of Behavior
We give the denitions of Optimistic Stable Standard of Behavior (OSSB) and Conservative
Stable Standard of Behavior (CSSB) due to Xue [14]. Some notations and denitions have to be
introduced. A path is a sequence (x
0
; x
1
; :::; x
m
) where for all j = 0; 1; :::;m   1, there exists a
coalition S
j
 I such that x
j
!
S
j
x
j+1
and x
j
; x
j+1
2 Z. Let  be the set of paths in Z, and 
x
the set of paths in Z originating from x. Xue [14] dened a standard of behavior as a function
 : Z ! 2

such that (x)  
x
for all x 2 Z. A standard of behavior is said to be internally
stable if 8x 2 Z; 8 2 (x); @y 2 ; @S  I; @z 2 Z such that y !
S
z and S \prefers" (z)
to . A standard of behavior is said to be externally stable if 8x 2 Z; 8 2 
x
n (x); 9y 2 ;
9S  I; 9z 2 Z such that y !
S
z and S \prefers" (z) to . A standard of behavior is stable
if it is both internally and externally stable.
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As in Greenberg [5], Xue [14] distinguished an optimistic and a conservative approach to
dene \prefers." In the optimistic approach a coalition S prefers (z) to  if 9 2 (z);
u
i
() < u
i
() 8i 2 S. In the conservative approach a coalition S prefers (z) to  if 8 2 (z);
u
i
() < u
i
() 8i 2 S. An OSSB is a stable standard of behavior, where \prefers" is dened by
the optimistic approach. A CSSB is a stable standard of behavior, where \prefers" is dened
by the conservative approach. Formally,
Denition 2 (Xue, 1998) Let  be a standard of behavior. Then,
(i)  is an OSSB if 8x 2 Z,  2 
x
n(x)() 9S  I, y 2 , and z 2 Z such that y !
S
z and
9 2 (z) : u
i
() < u
i
() 8i 2 S.
(ii)  is a CSSB if 8x 2 Z,  2 
x
n(x)() 9S  I, y 2 , and z 2 Z such that y !
S
z and
8 2 (z) 6= ; : u
i
() < u
i
() 8i 2 S:
2.4 Motivation and Examples
As has already been mentioned by Chwe [4] himself, the LCS is blurring or avoiding important
issues, and hence, suers substantial drawbacks. One drawback is that the LCS does not in-
corporate any idea of best response. Thereby, it is not very surprising that the LCS does not
always rule out all unreasonable moves. Figure 1 shows a social environment with one individual
-
?
u u
u
x
0
(1) x
1
(2)
x
2
(3)
f1g
f1g
Figure 1: Individual rationality.
that is currently at the status quo x
0
where she gets 1 unit of utility. She has the possibility
to move to outcome x
1
and obtain 2 units of utility, or to go to outcome x
2
and receive 3 units
of utility. In the social environment of Figure 1, LCS( ) = fx
1
; x
2
g: This is unreasonable as
a simple optimization dictates individual 1 to move to x
2
; in order to get a utility equal to 3
instead of 2. So, the LCS does not satisfy individual rationality.
5
5
Two other problems have also been mentioned by Chwe [4]. First, the LCS does not incorporate the decision
of subcoalitions to veto coalitional moves. Second, a coalition considers what further moves other coalitions will
6
It is more surprising that we have found social environments where LCS rules out too much.
This problem is more serious as LCS is developed to be a weak concept that rules out with
condence. In the social environment of Figure 2, there are three individuals that have the
- - -u u u u
x
0
(1; 1; 0) x
1
(2; 0; 0) x
2
(0; 0; 0) x
3
(0; 1; 0)
f1g f2g f3g
Figure 2: LCS may rule out too much
opportunity to move in a sequential manner. The status quo is x
0
: The utility tuples achievable
at the four outcomes are indicated in parentheses, with the utility of individual i in position i:
The direct dominance relation is given by x
0
< x
1
and the indirect one by x
0
 x
1
: It follows
that LCS( ) = fx
1
; x
2
; x
3
g; so outcome x
0
is ruled out. However, individual 1 only wants to
move from outcome x
0
to outcome x
1
if she is sure that individual 2 will not move from x
1
to
x
2
: Individual 2 does have incentives to move from x
1
to x
2
as the move to x
2
enables individual
3 to move to x
3
: It is only when individual 2 is sure that 3 does not move that he is indierent
between moving and not moving. Even under such extreme beliefs individual 2 would not loose
from moving to x
2
: It is therefore certainly reasonable for individual 1 not to move from outcome
x
0
to x
1
: A concept that aims to rule out with condence should not rule out outcome x
0
.
The OSSB seems to perform better than LCS for the social environment of Figure 2. It
holds that the unique OSSB is dened by (x
0
) = f(x
0
)g; (x
1
) = f(x
1
; x
2
; x
3
)g; (x
2
) =
f(x
2
); (x
2
; x
3
)g and (x
3
) = f(x
3
)g. The uniqueness of OSSB follows from Claim 3.11 in Xue
[14]. So individual 1 will not make the move from x
0
to x
1
; because she fears the move of
individual 2 from x
1
to x
2
. Less convincing is that (x
1
; x
2
) =2 (x
1
). Individual 2 hopes for the
best, so he is convinced that individual 3 moves from x
2
to x
3
. This is not consistent with the
fact that (x
2
) contains both (x
2
) and (x
2
; x
3
).
The CSSB is a truly weak concept. It doesn't rule out anything in the social environment
of Figure 2. But even though a CSSB is typically a very weak concept, it may also rule out
too much. In the social environment of Figure 3 there is a unique CSSB, given by (x
0
) = ;;
(x
1
) = f(x
1
)g and (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g. The uniqueness of CSSB follows from Claim 3.11 in Xue
make once it moves, but does not consider what other coalitions will do if it does not move. Hence, the LCS does
not allow for the possibility of coalitions moving to preempt the moves of other coalitions. Social rationalizability
(as well as Xue's [14] concepts) overcomes these problems.
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[14]. Although a unique CSSB exists, it is empty-valued for some status quos. A standard of
-
?
u u
u
x
0
(0; 0) x
2
(1; 2)
x
1
(2; 1)
f2g
f1g
Figure 3: CSSB and OSSB may rule out too much.
behavior that prescribes (x
0
) = f(x
0
; x
1
); (x
0
; x
2
)g; violates internal stability when one also
assigns the obvious (x
1
) = f(x
1
)g and (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g; since (x
0
; x
2
) 2 (x
0
); x
0
!
f1g
x
1
; and
(x
1
) is preferred to (x
0
; x
2
):
The unique OSSB coincides with the CSSB for the social environment of Figure 3, and may
therefore also be empty-valued and rule out too much, a feature that is less surprising for OSSB.
The example becomes even more striking when we add a move x
0
!
f1;2g
x
3
with payos  1
for both individuals. Then the unique CSSB and the unique OSSB are given by (x
0
) = ;;
(x
1
) = f(x
1
)g; (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g and (x
3
) = f(x
3
)g: The solution concepts CSSB and OSSB
do not distinguish the moves to x
1
and x
2
on the one hand, and the move to x
3
on the other.
Another possibility is to add a move x
3
!
f1g
x
0
and to put the utility of both individuals to  1
at x
3
. The standard of behavior (x
3
) = f(x
3
)g; (x
0
) = ;; (x
1
) = f(x
1
)g; and (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g
is both an OSSB and a CSSB. The worst outcome is stable.
CSSB and OSSB may also rule out too little. In the social environment of Figure 4, the
only sensible standard of behavior is (x
0
) = f(x
0
)g. Nevertheless, the standard of behavior
-
?
u u
u
x
0
(3; 3) x
2
(2; 1)
x
1
(1; 2)
f2g
f1g
Figure 4: OSSB and CSSB may rule out too little.
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(x
0
) = f(x
0
); (x
0
; x
1
); (x
0
; x
2
)g; (x
1
) = f(x
1
)g and (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g is both the unique CSSB
and the unique OSSB. It may look like this phenomenon is caused by the absence of the no-move.
But even if we add moves x
0
!
f1g
x
0
; x
0
!
f2g
x
0
; x
0
!
f1;2g
x
0
, then the standard of behav-
ior dened by (x
0
) = f(x
0
); (x
0
; x
1
); (x
0
; x
2
); (x
0
; x
0
); (x
0
; x
0
; x
1
); (x
0
; x
0
; x
2
); (x
0
; x
0
; x
0
);   g;
(x
1
) = f(x
1
)g and (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g is a CSSB. OSSB seems to do better now, as the unique
OSSB is given by (x
0
) = f(x
0
); (x
0
; x
0
); (x
0
; x
0
; x
0
);   g; (x
1
) = f(x
1
)g; and (x
2
) = f(x
2
)g.
In order to remedy these drawbacks, we propose a notion of rationalizability for social en-
vironments, which identies the coalitions that are likely to form and the outcomes that might
occur when (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and
(2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo.
3 Rationalizable Social Behaviors
3.1 Individual and Social Behaviors
In what follows, we denote the move of coalition S from x to y, x !
S
y, by (xy; S). The
no-move at status-quo x is denoted by (xx; ;). One has to distinguish between (xx; ;) and
(xx; fig). Indeed, (xx; fig) means that individual i can move from x to x. The set of all
possible moves and no-move is given by M = f (xy; S)j x; y 2 Z; x!
S
yg [ f(xx; ;)jx 2 Zg : An
original status-quo is given, and it is denoted x
0
. We consider histories starting at x
0
. We
denote by h = (x
0
;m
1
;m
2
; :::;m
k 1
) a history of length k, where x
0
2 Z is the status-quo,
m
j
= (m
 
j
m
+
j
;m
c
j
) 2M , m
 
1
= x
0
, m
+
j
= m
 
j+1
and m
c
j
denotes the coalition of individuals that
moves from m
 
j
to m
+
j
, j = 1; :::; k   1. The length of a history h is denoted l(h) with l (h) = 1
for h = (x
0
). To make the length of a history h explicit, we sometimes denote it by h
k
, where
k is the length of the history. Let h
 
= x
0
be the original status-quo of h and h
+
= m
+
l(h) 1
be
the end outcome of h. Given h
k
and j  k (j; k 2 N), we call h
j
a sub-history of h
k
if h
j
consists
of the rst j elements of h
k
, and we write h
j
 h
k
. A history is dierent from a path as used in
the theory of stable standards of behavior. A path only gives a sequence of outcomes, whereas
for a history it also matters which coalition made the move from one outcome to another.
The set of feasible moves after history h is denoted byM (h) = fm 2M j h
+
= m
 
g nf(h
+
h
+
;
;)g for all h. It does not include the no-move. Let M
i
(h) = f (xy; S) 2M (h)j i 2 Sg be the set
of feasible moves after history h involving individual i. The set of individuals that has a move
after history h is denoted I (h) = f i 2 IjM
i
(h) 6= ;g.
We denote by H the set of all histories with nite length and by H(J) the set of histories
with at most J moves. That is, H (J) = fh 2 Hj l (h)  J + 1g. Temporarily we x J and
consider only histories in H(J). Let H
i
(J) = fh 2 H (J)jM
i
(h) 6= ;g. It is the set of histories
that contain at most J moves and after which individual i is involved in a move. Individual i's
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opponents are denoted by  i. As general notation, we denote by (X) the set of all probability
measures on X. For nite X, we denote by 
0
(X) the set of all probability measures giving
positive probability to each member of X.
A social behavior selects after any history a unique move or a no-move. We denote it by
b = (b (h))
h2H(J)
where b (h) 2 M(h) [ f(h
+
h
+
; ;)g. Let B be the set of all social behaviors.
Our aim is to nd those social behaviors that are rationalizable. From the rationalizable social
behaviors, we derive the set of outcomes that are stable. We aim for a concept that is weak, so
rules out with condence. To do this, we examine individual behaviors rst.
We model an individual behavior as, for each history, the set of coalitional moves the in-
dividual agrees to join and those she decides to block. Observe that the framework of social
environments does not exclude that an individual might agree to join more than one coali-
tional move (if possible). Formally, a behavior of individual i is b
i
= (b
i
( j h))
h2H
i
(J)
where
b
i
( j h) : M
i
(h) ! f0; 1g. If b
i
((xy; S) j h) = 1 then i 2 S agrees to join in the potential move
of coalition S from x to y. If b
i
((xy; S) j h) = 0 then i 2 S blocks the move of coalition S from
x to y. The set of all possible behaviors of individual i is denoted by B
i
.
It may happen that the individuals agree on more than one move. We denote by M (h) =

M


; 6=M M (h)
	
the collection of sets of feasible moves after h. For every history h 2
H (J), the agreement function is a mapping f( j h) :
Q
i2N
B
i
! M (h) [ f(h
+
h
+
; ;)g which
associates to the proles of individual behaviors the set of moves after history h on which there
is agreement, so
(i) f((b
i
)
i2N
j h) = M 2 M (h) if 8(xy; S) 2 M , 8i 2 S, we have b
i
((xy; S) j h) = 1 and
8(xy; S) 2M(h) nM , 9i 2 S such that b
i
((xy; S) j h) = 0;
(ii) f((b
i
)
i2N
j h) = (h
+
h
+
; ;) if 8(xy; S) 2M (h), 9i 2 S such that b
i
((xy; S) j h) = 0.
Individual behaviors depend on histories only. In particular, individual behaviors are not allowed
to depend on the set of moves on which there has been agreement in the past. One interpretation
consistent with such individual behaviors is that after each history the individuals behaviors are
transmitted to a mediator, which determines a move in the set of moves on which there is
agreement, or selects the no-move when no agreement is possible. The mediator reports this
move in the agreement set or the no-move to the individuals, but not the agreement set itself.
A prole of individual behaviors induces a social behavior or a number of social behaviors.
A social behavior is induced by a prole of individual behaviors if for each history the move
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prescribed by the social behavior is a move on which there is agreement by all individuals
involved in the move, or the no-move when no agreement is possible.
3.2 Beliefs, Conjectures and Payos
A problem arises when there are several moves on which agreement is possible. One alter-
native is to assume that all individuals have uniform implementability prior-beliefs on the
set M(h): The likelihood of a particular move in the set of moves on which there is agree-
ment, is then determined by Bayesian updating. This results in uniform ex post beliefs on
the agreement set. We allow the individuals to have general implementability prior-beliefs on
the set M(h): Moreover, it is assumed that the implementability prior-beliefs of the individ-
uals are cautious. Let q
i
= (q
i
( j h))
h2H(J)
be the implementability prior-belief of individ-
ual i, where q
i
( j h) : M (h) ! 
0
(M(h)). Hence, given a set of agreements M  M(h),
the probability individual i assigns to the implementation of the move m 2 M is given by
q
i
(m j h;M ) = (q
i
(m j h))  [
P
m2M
q
i
(m j h)]
 1
if m 2 M and q
i
(m j h;M ) = 0 otherwise. Let
Q
i
be the set of all functions q
i
.
The basis for rationalizability is that individuals form conjectures about each others' behavior
and then optimize subject to these conjectures. We restrict the individuals to hold uncorrelated
conjectures
6
about the behaviors of their opponents. After each history h 2 H
i
(J) at which
individual i is involved in a move, she holds such conjectures. A conjecture of individual i is
a mapping c
i
: H
i
(J) !
Q
j 6=i
(B
j
). We denote by c
i
(h
0
) (b
 i
) the probability individual i
conjectures at history h
0
that her opponents behavior is b
 i
. We denote c
j
i
(h
0
)(b
j
) 2 (B
j
) the
probability individual i conjectures at history h
0
that player j's behavior is b
j
. Notice that a
conjecture may change as the course of the social situation unfolds, and that there is only a
need for an individual to form conjectures when an individual is potentially involved in a move.
A conjecture c
i
reaches h 2 H
i
(J) if there is an individual behavior b
i
, and there are in-
dividual behaviors of her opponents b
 i
in the support of c
i
such that (b
i
; b
 i
) reaches h. A
prole (b
i
; b
 i
) reaches h = (x
0
;m
1
; :::;m
k
) if b
i
(m
j
j h
j
) = 1 8i 2 m
c
j
, j = 1; :::; k. A behavior
b
i
reaches h if there is b
 i
such that (b
i
; b
 i
) reaches h. A set A
 i
 B
 i
reaches h if there is
(b
i
; b
 i
) with b
 i
2 A
 i
reaching h.
Given b
i
2 B
i
, q
i
2 Q
i
, c
i
: H
i
(J)!
Q
j 6=i
(B
j
), and h
0
2 H
i
(J), the probability individual
i at h
0
believes that history h = (x
0
;m
1
;m
2
; :::;m
k
)  h
0
will be followed by the move m
k+1
is denoted by d
i
(h
0
)(m
k+1
j h) with d
i
(h
0
) ( j h) 2 (M (h) [ f(h
+
h
+
; ;)g). Whenever (b
i
; c
i
)
6
The analysis where individuals hold correlated conjectures about the behaviors of their opponents is very
similar.
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reaches h; this realization probability is determined as follows:
d
i
(h
0
)(m
k+1
j h)
=
P
b
 i
h
p(b
 i
j c
i
(h
0
))  p(h;m
k+1
j b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
)
i
P
(xy;S)2M(h)[f(h
+
h
+
;;)g
P
b
 i
[p(b
 i
j c
i
(h
0
))  p(h; (xy; S) j b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
)]
,
for m
k+1
2 M (h) ; where p(b
 i
j c
i
(h
0
)) = c
i
(h
0
) (b
 i
) and p(h; (xy; S) j b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) is the prob-
ability that h = (x
0
;m
1
;m
2
; :::;m
k
) realizes and is followed by m
k+1
= (xy; S), given b
i
, b
 i
and q
i
. If (xy; S) 2 M(h) then p(h; (xy; S) j b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) =
Q
k+1
j=1
q
i
(m
j
j h
j
; f(b
i
; b
 i
j h
j
)).
If (xy; S) = (h
+
h
+
; ;) then p(h; (xy; S) j b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) =
Q
k
j=1
q
i
(m
j
j h
j
; f(b
i
; b
 i
j h
j
)) if
f(b
i
; b
 i
j h) = (h
+
h
+
; ;), and p(h; (xy; S) j b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) = 0 if f(b
i
; b
 i
j h )6= (h
+
h
+
; ;), which
reects that when there is agreement on some moves the no-move is never implemented.
Given (b
i
; c
i
; q
i
); where (b
i
; c
i
) reaches h
0
; the expected utility of individual i conditional on
reaching history h
0
is
U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) =
X
x2Z
2
6
4
X
(
h
0
;m
l(h
0
)
;:::;m
k
)
2h
 1
(fxg)
k
Y
j=l(h
0
)
d
i
(h
0
)(m
j
j (h
0
;m
l(h
0
)
; : : : ;m
j 1
))
3
7
5
u
i
(x) ,
where h
 1
(fxg) = fh 2 H (J)j l (h) = J and h
+
= x or h = (x
0
;m
1
; :::;m
k 1
; (xx; ;)) with
k < Jg is the set of histories of length at most J ending at x 2 Z.
3.3 Social Rationalizability
We next propose two alternative denitions of social rationalizability which we show to be
equivalent. The rst one is strongly inuenced by Battigalli's [1] extensive-form rationalizability
and is based on the notion of a hierarchy of nested hypotheses. The second one is motivated by
Pearce's [8] original extensive-form rationalizability and is based on a reduction procedure.
7
The concept of social rationalizability based on the approach of Battigalli is based on two
assumptions: (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and
(2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. A rational individual i maximizes her
expected payo at each history h reached by the play, subject to her consistent updating system
of conjectures, c
i
.
7
Pearce's [8] extensive-form rationalizability (EFR), like most extensive-form theories, does not adequately
deal with counterfactuals and strategic manipulations of conjectures. Battigalli [1] overcomes such drawbacks by
providing an alternative characterization of EFR which is not a reduction procedure. Only individuals' updating
systems of conjectures are restricted. Such restrictions are modeled as a hierarchy of nested hypotheses, ruling out
strategic manipulation. This hierarchy corresponds to the sequence of strategy sets given by Pearce's [8] iterative
deletion procedure.
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Denition 3 A consistent updating system for individual i is a mapping c
i
: H
i
(J)!
Q
j 6=i
(B
j
),
such that for all g; h 2 H
i
(J) :
(i) c
i
(h) reaches h,
(ii) if g < h and c
i
(g) reaches h, then c
i
(g) = c
i
(h).
The consistency of the updating system requires that the conjecture at history h is consistent
with h being reached and that no conjecture is changed unless falsied. That is, individuals
update according to Bayes rule whenever possible. An individual behavior b
i
is individually
rational if it is a best response to some cautious consistent updating system c
i
and to some
implementability prior-belief q
i
. In Denition 4, R
1
i
is the set of individual behaviors of i that
are individually rational. Higher degrees of rationality are constructed recursively.
Denition 4 Let R
0
=
Q
i2I
B
i
. For n  1, R
n
=
Q
i2I
R
n
i
is inductively dened as follows:
for all i 2 I, b
i
2 R
n
i
if there exists q
i
2 Q
i
and a consistent updating system c
i
such that
(i) for all h
0
2 H
i
(J), c
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
k

j
) where k

is the maximal element in f0; 1; :::; n   1g
such that R
k

 i
reaches h
0
,
(ii) for all h
0
2 H
i
(J), if b
i
reaches h
0
, then b
i
is a best response to (c
i
(h
0
); q
i
) at h
0
, that is,
for all
b
b
i
2 B
i
, U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
), where b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
is the behavior which results
from b
i
when behavior at h
0
and its followers g > h
0
is specied by
b
b
i
.
The set R
1
(J) = lim
n!1
R
n
is the set of rationalizable individual behaviors where histories
contain at most J moves.
Denition 4 can be interpreted as follows. The sequence R
1
j
, R
2
j
, R
3
j
, ... (j 6= i) represents
for individual i a hierarchy of increasingly strong hypotheses about the behavior of individual
j. When individual i adopts a behavior b
i
2 R
1
i
(J), she always holds the strongest hypothesis
which is consistent with the history reached (part (i) in Denition 4) and optimizes accordingly.
Two important distinctions to extensive form rationalizability are that optimization takes place
against both c
i
and q
i
; and that conjectures are cautious.
The concept of social rationalizability based on the ideas in Pearce [8] is a reduction procedure
and is dened as follows.
Denition 5 Let P
0
=
Q
i2I
B
i
. For n  1, P
n
=
Q
i2I
P
n
i
is inductively dened as follows:
for all i 2 I, b
i
2 P
n
i
if
(i) b
i
2 P
n 1
i
,
(ii) there exists q
i
2 Q
i
and a consistent updating system c
i
such that for all h
0
2 H
i
(J) that
are reached by b
i
and P
n 1
 i
it holds
(a) c
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
n 1
j
),
(b) for all
b
b
i
2 P
n 1
i
, U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
).
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The set P
1
(J) = lim
n!1
P
n
is the set of rationalizable individual behaviors where histories
contain at most J moves.
Theorem 1 claims that the two denitions of social rationalizability are equivalent. Through-
out the rest of the paper we focus on social rationalizability a la Pearce.
Theorem 1 For all n  0; R
n
= P
n
.
Proof. Obviously, R
0
= P
0
: We give a proof by induction, so suppose R
n 1
= P
n 1
:
Consider some b
i
2 R
n
i
: Since R
n
 R
n 1
= P
n 1
; it holds that b
i
2 P
n 1
i
; and Condition (i) in
Denition 5 is satised. Suppose h
0
2 H
i
(J) is reached by b
i
and P
n 1
 i
: By the denition of R
n
i
;
there exists q
i
2 Q
i
and a consistent updating system c
i
such that c
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
n 1
j
) =
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
n 1
j
) and b
i
is a best response to (c
i
(h
0
); q
i
) at h
0
; that is, for all
b
b
i
2 B
i
 P
n 1
i
;
U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
): It follows that Conditions (iia) and (iib) in Denition 5
are satised, so b
i
2 P
n
i
:
Consider some b
i
2 P
n
i
: Since P
n
 P
n 1
= R
n 1
; it holds that b
i
2 R
n 1
i
: Since b
i
2 R
n 1
i
;
there exists q
i
2 Q
i
and a consistent updating system c
i
such that if b
i
reaches h 2 H
i
(J) then
b
i
is a best response to c
i
(h) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
k

j
) and q
i
; where k

 n   2: Since b
i
2 P
n
i
; there
exists bq
i
2 Q
i
and a consistent updating system bc
i
such that if b
i
and P
n 1
 i
= R
n 1
 i
reach
h 2 H
i
(J); then bc
i
(h) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
n 1
j
) =
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
n 1
j
); and for all
b
b
i
2 P
n 1
i
= R
n 1
i
;
U
i
(h)(b
i
;bc
i
; bq
i
)  U
i
(h)(b
i
=
b
b
i
;bc
i
; bq
i
): The use of a cautious bq
i
and a cautious consistent updating
system bc
i
implies that bc
i
(h) = bc
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
n 1
j
) for all h; h
0
2 H
i
(J) reached by R
n 1
 i
:
We dene ec
i
by
ec
i
(h) = bc
i
(h) if h 2 H
i
(J) is reached by R
n 1
i
ec
i
(h) = c
i
(h) if h 2 H
i
(J) is not reached by R
n 1
i
;
and eq
i
by
eq
i
( j h) = bq
i
( j h) if h 2 H(J) is reached by R
n 1
i
;
eq
i
( j h) = q
i
( j h) if h 2 H(J) is not reached by R
n 1
i
:
It can be veried that eq
i
2 Q
i
and that ec
i
is a consistent updating system.
For k

the maximal element in f0; 1; : : : ; n   1g such that R
k

 i
reaches h
0
2 H
i
(J); it holds
that ec
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
k

j
); so ec
i
satises Condition (i) of Denition 4.
It remains to be shown that for all h
0
2 H
i
(J); if b
i
reaches h
0
; then b
i
is a best response to
(ec
i
(h
0
); eq
i
) at h
0
; that is, for all
b
b
i
2 B
i
; U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
): If h
0
is not reached
by R
n 1
i
; then b
i
is a best response to c
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(R
k

j
) and q
i
; where k

 n  2; and, by
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denition of ec
i
; eq
i
; b
i
is therefore a best response to (ec
i
(h
0
); eq
i
) at h
0
: If h
0
is reached by R
n 1
i
;
then for all
b
b
i
2 P
n 1
i
;
U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
;bc
i
; bq
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
;bc
i
; bq
i
);
and so, by denition of (ec
i
; eq
i
);
U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
):
It remains to be shown that there is no
b
b
i
2 B
i
n P
n 1
i
such that
U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
) < U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
):
Since h
0
is reached by b
i
andR
n 1
i
; h
0
occurs with positive probability. But then U
i
(x
0
)(b
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
) <
U
i
(x
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
): Let
b
B
i
= f
b
b
i
2 B
i
j
b
b
i
maximizes U
i
(x
0
)(
b
b
i
;ec
i
; eq
i
)g:
Notice that
b
B
i
 B
i
nP
n 1
i
: Let k  n 2 be the smallest integer such that
b
B
i
\P
k
i
6= ;: We will
show that one of the elements of
b
B
i
belongs to P
k+1
i
. To do so we need a consistent updating
system c
i
such that c
i
(h) belongs to
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
k
j
) for all histories h 2 H
i
(J) reached by P
k
 i
against which some member of
b
B
i
is a best response in P
k
i
. Consider a perturbation c
i
(h
0
) of
ec
i
(h
0
) that belongs to
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
k
j
); choose c
i
(h) = c
i
(h
0
) for all histories h 2 H
i
(J) reached by
P
k
 i
and choose c
i
(h) at other histories such that c
i
is consistent. The perturbation c
i
can be
chosen small enough to guarantee that U
i
(x
0
)(
b
b
i
; c
i
; eq
i
) > U
i
(x
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; eq
i
); for all
b
b
i
2
b
B
i
; for all
b
i
2 B
i
n
b
B
i
: Consider an optimal choice in P
k
i
against (c
i
; eq
i
): Obviously it is an element of
b
B
i
;
but then
b
B
i
\ P
k+1
i
6= ;; contradicting the denition of k:
Obviously, from Theorem 1, R
1
(J) = P
1
(J). Let S
1
(J) denote the set of rationalizable
social behaviors. A social behavior b belongs to S
1
(J) if there exists (b
i
)
i2I
2 P
1
(J) such that
b(h) = m 2M(h) implies b
i
(m j h) = 1; 8i 2 m
c
; and b(h) = (h
+
h
+
; ;) implies f(b
i
; b
 i
j h) = ;:
We denote by Z
1
J
(x
0
) the set of rationalizable outcomes with original status-quo x
0
2 Z. It is
given by Z
1
J
(x
0
) = fx 2 Z j 9 (x
0
;m
1
; :::;m
k
) 2 h
 1
(fxg), 9b 2 S
1
(J) such that 8j = 1; :::; k,
b(x
0
;m
1
; :::;m
j 1
) = m
j
g. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes, Z
1
(x
0
); is obtained
by letting J go to innity, Z
1
(x
0
) = limsup
J!1
Z
1
J
(x
0
) : The set of socially rationalizable
outcomes is never empty.
Theorem 2 Z
1
(x
0
) 6= ;.
Proof. Consider the iterative procedure provided by Denition 5. For each iteration n, choose a
q
i
2 Q
i
and a consistent updating system c
i
such that c
i
(h
0
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
n 1
j
) for all h
0
2 H
i
(J)
reached by P
n 1
. Consider any b
i
2 P
n 1
i
such that U
i
(x
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
)  U
i
(x
0
)(
b
b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) for all
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bb
i
2 P
n 1
i
. If h
0
is reached by b
i
and P
n 1
 i
then it follows as in the proof of Theorem 1 that
U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
)  U
i
(h
0
)(b
i
=
b
b
h
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) for all
b
b
i
2 P
n 1
i
. It follows that b
i
2 P
n
i
, so P
n
6= ;.
Since P
0
is nite and P
n
 P
n+1
, there is N such that P
n
= P
n
0
for all n; n
0
 N . It follows
that P
1
(J) = P
N
6= ;. Any (b
i
)
i2I
2 P
1
(J) yields a social behavior b 2 S
1
(J), so S
1
(J) 6= ;;
and as a consequence Z
1
J
(x
0
) 6= ;. As a subset of the nite set Z it holds that Z
1
J
(x
0
) is nite.
Now it follows from the denition of the limit superior that Z
1
(x
0
) 6= ;.
We reconsider the ve examples and we show that social rationalizability remedies the prob-
lems of the largest consistent set, the optimistic stable standard of behavior, and the conservative
stable standard of behavior. Even though the denitions so far may seem rather complicated,
the examples are easily solved for by the reduction procedure of Denition 5.
Example 1: Consider again the social environment where I = f1g, Z = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, and
the eectiveness relations as well as the payos are depicted in Figure 1. We have H
1
(J) =
f(x
0
)g and M
1
(x
0
) = f(x
0
x
1
; f1g); (x
0
x
2
; f1g)g. Any behavior of individual 1 is such that
b
1
((x
0
x
1
; f1g) j (x
0
)) = 1 or 0 and b
1
((x
0
x
2
; f1g) j (x
0
)) = 1 or 0. For simplicity, we denote the
set of all behaviors of individual 1 as B
1
= f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g where (0; 1) means that
b
1
((x
0
x
1
; f1g) j (x
0
)) = 0 and b
1
((x
0
x
2
; f1g) j (x
0
)) = 1. By Denition 5, P
0
= B
1
. Obviously,
the unique best response for individual 1 is her behavior (0; 1). Hence, this social environment
has a unique rationalizable social behavior b(x
0
) = (x
0
x
2
; f1g) and a unique rationalizable out-
come Z
1
(x
0
) = fx
2
g. So, contrary to the largest consistent set, social rationalizability satises
individual rationality.
Example 2: Consider again the social environment where I = f1; 2; 3g, Z = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
g,
and the eectiveness relations as well as the payos are depicted in Figure 2. Let h
1
= (x
0
),
h
2
= (x
0
; (x
0
x
1
; f1g)) and h
3
= (x
0
; (x
0
x
1
; f1g); (x
1
x
2
; f2g)). We have H
i
(J) = fh
i
g and
M
i
(h
i
) = f(x
i 1
x
i
; fig)g, i = 1; 2; 3. Any behavior of individual i is such that b
i
((x
i 1
x
i
; fig) j
h
i
) = 1 or 0. The set of all behaviors of individual i is B
i
= f0; 1g, i 2 I. By Denition 5,
P
0
= B
1
B
2
B
3
. When individual 3 gets the move, she is really indierent between moving
and not moving, so P
1
3
= B
3
. When individual 2 contemplates the move from x
1
to x
2
, he conjec-
tures a positive probability to individual 3 moving to x
3
. Indeed, any c
2
(h
2
) 2 
0
(B
1
)
0
(B
3
)
puts positive probability weight on both b
3
((x
2
x
3
; f3g) j h
3
) = 1 and b
3
((x
2
x
3
; f3g) j h
3
) = 0.
Hence, the unique optimal behavior for individual 2 is b
2
((x
1
x
2
; f2g) j h
2
) = 1, and P
1
2
is a
proper subset of B
2
: P
1
2
= f1g. Initially, individual 1 puts positive probability weight on all
behaviors of 2 and 3, and depending on her conjectures she decides to stay at x
0
or to move
to x
1
, so P
1
1
= B
1
. However, in the second iteration she knows that individual 2 will move
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to x
2
for sure when given the move: any c
1
(h
1
) 2 
0
(P
1
2
)  
0
(P
1
3
) gives probability one to
b
2
((x
1
x
2
; f2g) j h
2
) = 1. Therefore, the unique optimal behavior for individual 1 is to stay at x
0
:
b
1
((x
0
x
1
; f1g) j h
1
) = 0. So, P
1
1
= f0g, P
1
2
= f1g and P
1
3
= B
3
. The unique rationalizable
(or stable) outcome is the original status-quo, Z
1
(x
0
) = fx
0
g:
Example 3: Consider again the social environment where I = f1; 2g, Z = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, and
the eectiveness relations as well as the payos are depicted in Figure 3. Let h
1
= (x
0
). We
have H
i
(J) = fh
1
g and M
i
(h
1
) = f(x
0
x
i
; fig)g, i 2 I. Any behavior of individual i is such that
b
i
((x
0
x
i
; fig) j h
1
) = 1 or 0. The set of all behaviors of individual i is B
i
= f0; 1g, i 2 I. By
Denition 5, P
0
= B
1
 B
2
. Given any q
i
2 Q
i
and any c
i
(h
1
) 2 
0
(B
 i
), individual i has a
unique best response which is to move to x
i
. So, b
i
((x
0
x
i
; fig) j h
1
) = 1, P
1
i
= P
1
i
= f1g, i 2 I,
and Z
1
(x
0
) = fx
1
; x
2
g.
Example 4: Consider again the social environment where I = f1; 2g, Z = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, and
the eectiveness relations as well as the payos are depicted in Figure 4. Let h
1
= (x
0
). We
have H
i
(J) = fh
1
g and M
i
(h
1
) = f(x
0
x
i
; fig)g, i 2 I. Any behavior of individual i is such that
b
i
((x
0
x
i
; fig) j h
1
) = 1 or 0. The set of all behaviors of individual i is B
i
= f0; 1g, i 2 I. By
Denition 5, P
0
= B
1
 B
2
. Given any q
i
2 Q
i
and any c
i
(h
1
) 2 
0
(B
 i
), individual i has a
unique best response which is not to move. So, b
i
((x
0
x
i
; fig) j h
1
) = 0, P
1
i
= P
1
i
= f0g, i 2 I,
and Z
1
(x
0
) = fx
0
g.
Example 5: It is possible to describe the classical prisoners' dilemma as a social environment.
The set of pure strategies of individual i is Z
i
= fcooperate, defectg, i = 1; 2, and Z = Z
1
 Z
2
is the set of strategy proles. Assume that coalitions cannot form. Then, one way to represent
-
 -
?
66
?
u u
u u
x
0
(2; 2) x
2
(0; 3)
x
3
(1; 1)x
1
(3; 0)
f2g
f1g
f2g
f1g
Figure 5: The prisoners' dilemma
this normal-form game as a social environment is Greenberg's [5] individual contingent threats
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situation, where 8x; y 2 Z, x !
S
y if S = fig and x
Infig
= y
Infig
. This social environment
is depicted in Figure 5, where x
0
= (cooperate, cooperate), x
1
= (defect, cooperate), x
2
=
(cooperate, defect), and x
3
= (defect, defect):
Consider rst the case J = 1. Let h
1
= (x
0
). We have H
i
(J) = fh
1
g and M
i
(h
1
) =
f(x
0
x
i
; fig)g, i = 1; 2. Any behavior of individual i is such that b
i
((x
0
x
i
; fig) j h
1
) = 1 or 0.
The set of all behaviors of individual i is B
i
= f0; 1g. By Denition 5, P
0
= B
1
 B
2
. Given
any q
i
2 Q
i
and any c
i
(h
1
) 2 
0
(B
 i
), individual i has a unique best response which is to move:
b
i
((x
0
x
i
; fig) j h
1
) = 1. So, P
1
i
= P
1
i
= f1g, i = 1; 2, and Z
1
1
(x
0
) = fx
1
; x
2
g.
Consider now the case J = 2. Let h
1
= (x
0
), h
2
= (x
0
; (x
0
x
1
; f1g)), h
3
= (x
0
; (x
0
x
2
; f2g)).
We have H
i
(J) = fh
1
; h
2
; h
3
g, M
1
(h
1
) = f(x
0
x
1
; f1g)g, M
1
(h
2
) = f(x
1
x
0
; f1g)g, M
1
(h
3
) =
f(x
2
x
3
; f1g)g, M
2
(h
1
) = f(x
0
x
2
; f2g)g, M
2
(h
2
) = f(x
1
x
3
; f2g)g and M
2
(h
3
) = f(x
2
x
0
; f2g)g.
The set of behaviors of individual i is B
i
= f(0; 0; 0), (1; 0; 0), (0; 1; 0), (0; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), (1; 0; 1),
(0; 1; 1), (1; 1; 1)g, where (1; 0; 1) simply means b
1
((x
0
x
1
; f1g) j h
1
) = 1, b
1
((x
1
x
0
; f1g) j h
2
) = 0,
b
1
((x
2
x
3
; f1g) j h
3
) = 1 for individual 1, and b
2
((x
0
x
2
; f2g) j h
1
) = 1, b
2
((x
1
x
3
; f2g) j h
2
) = 0,
b
2
((x
2
x
0
; f2g) j h
3
) = 1 for individual 2. Let q
i
= (q
i
(h
1
); q
i
(h
2
); q
i
(h
3
)) where q
i
(h
k
) = (q
h
k
i
; 1 
q
h
k
i
) and q
h
k
i
is the probability assigned by the implementability prior-belief of individual i that
her move will be implemented after h
k
if both individuals decide to move.
One can show that, for all b
i
2 B
i
there exists a consistent updating system c
i
with c
i
(h
1
) 2

0
(B
j
) and there exists a belief q
i
2 Q
i
such that b
i
is the unique best response among B
i
; and
so b
i
2 P
1
i
. For instance, b
1
= (0; 1; 1) is the unique best response against the belief q
1
such that
q
h
1
1
= q
h
2
1
= q
h
3
1
=
1
2
and the conjecture c
1
such that
c
2
1
(h
1
)(b
2
) =
8
>
>
<
>
:
4
8
if b
2
= (0; 1; 0)
3
8
if b
2
= (0; 1; 1)
1
48
otherwise
.
One can verify that, after each history, b
1
is the unique best response, and hence, b
1
= (0; 1; 1) 2
P
1
1
. In Table 1 we give for each behavior b
1
2 B
1
beliefs and conjectures against which it is the
unique best response. For example, the fth column means that b
1
= (1; 1; 1) is the unique best
response against the conjecture c
1
such that
c
2
1
(h
1
)(b
2
) =
8
>
<
>
>
:
2
8
if b
2
= (1; 0; 0) or b
2
= (1; 1; 0)
3
8
if b
2
= (0; 1; 1)
1
40
otherwise
.
and the implementability prior-belief q
1
such that q
h
1
1
= q
h
3
1
=
1
2
and q
h
2
1
=
3
4
.
Using the symmetry of the prisoners' dilemma it is straightforward that all b
2
2 B
2
belong
to P
1
2
. So, applying social rationalizability to the prisoners' dilemma, we obtain for J = 2 that
all behaviors are rationalizable: P
1
i
= B
i
= P
1
i
, i = 1; 2, and Z
1
2
(x
0
) = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
g.
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b1
b
2
(0; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 1; 1) (1; 1; 1) (0; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0) (1; 0; 0) (1; 1; 0)
(0; 0; 0)
1
40
1
48
1
48
1
40
1
40
1
48
2
48
1
40
(0; 0; 1)
1
40
1
48
1
48
1
40
1
40
1
48
3
8
1
40
(1; 0; 0)
1
40
4
8
1
48
2
8
1
40
1
48
2
48
2
8
(0; 1; 0)
3
8
3
8
4
8
1
40
1
40
1
48
2
48
1
40
(1; 1; 0)
1
40
1
48
1
48
2
8
1
40
1
48
2
48
1
40
(0; 1; 1)
1
40
1
48
3
8
3
8
3
8
4
8
2
48
4
8
(1; 0; 1)
3
8
1
48
1
48
1
40
3
8
1
48
3
8
1
40
(1; 1; 1)
1
8
1
48
1
48
1
40
1
8
3
8
2
48
1
8
q
h
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
4
q
h
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
4
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
4
q
h
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
4
Table 1: Best responses, conjectures and beliefs in the prisoners' dilemma.
4 Coalitional Rationality
Social rationalizability is based on common knowledge of individual rationality. An interesting
theory of social behavior should also be expected to satisfy at least some rudimentary forms of
coalitional rationality. It is conceivable that coalitions fail to choose between a set of outcomes,
because of internal disputes on the outcome on which to coordinate. If, on the other hand, the
outcomes are Pareto ranked, then a sensible concept of coalitional rationality should prescribe
coordination on the outcome that Pareto dominates all the others. We can formalize this within
the theory of social environments.
Consider the social environment  

where I = f1; 2; :::;#Ig, Z = fx
0
; x
1
; :::; x
N
g, the out-
comes are Pareto ranked: u
i
(x
N
) > u
i
(x
N 1
) > ::: > u
i
(x
1
) > u
i
(x
0
) = 0 8i 2 I, and only
x
0
!
I
x
k
, k = 1; :::; N; are possible moves. A two-individual case with N = 3 is depicted
in Figure 6. We say that social rationalizability satises coalitional rationality if it selects the
Pareto-dominant outcome, x
N
.
In this social environment  

, we have I(x
0
) = I, H
i
= f(x
0
)g and M(x
0
) = M
i
(x
0
) =
f(x
0
x
1
; I); (x
0
x
2
; I); :::; (x
0
x
N
; I)g; 8i 2 I. A behavior of individual i is denoted by b
i
=
(b
i1
; :::; b
ik
; :::; b
iN
) where b
ik
= b
i
((x
0
x
k
; I) j (x
0
)); so, b
ik
is component k of b
i
. A belief of
individual i over the implementability of agreements is denoted by q
i
= (q
i1
; :::; q
ik
; :::; q
iN
)
where q
ik
is the probability assigned by the implementability prior-belief of individual i to the
move (x
0
x
k
; I). From now on we denote the history (x
0
) by h
1
.
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Example 6: Consider the two-individual and three-move case, I = f1; 2g, Z = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
g,
x
0
!
I
x
k
, k = 1; 2; 3, are the only possible moves, and the special case where u
i
(x
k
) = k;
8k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; 8i 2 f1; 2g. This social environment is depicted in Figure 6. The behaviors of
individual i are such that b
i
((x
0
x
k
; f1; 2g) j h
1
) = 1 or b
i
((x
0
x
k
; f1; 2g) j h
1
) = 0, k = 1; 2; 3. The
set of all behaviors of individual i is B
i
= f(0; 0; 0), (1; 0; 0), (0; 1; 0), (0; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), (1; 0; 1),
(0; 1; 1), (1; 1; 1)g, where (1; 0; 1) simply means b
i
((x
0
x
1
; f1; 2g) j h
1
) = 1, b
i
((x
0
x
2
; f1; 2g) j
h
1
) = 0, b
i
((x
0
x
3
; f1; 2g) j h
1
) = 1 for individual i, i = 1; 2. Which outcomes are socially
rationalizable? Is the Pareto-dominant outcome the unique socially rationalizable one?
 -
?
u u u
u
x
1
(1; 1) x
0
(0; 0) x
2
(2; 2)
x
3
(3; 3)
f1; 2g f1; 2g
f1; 2g
Figure 6: Coalitional rationality.
By Denition 5, P
0
i
= B
i
. We show rst that (0; 0; 0), (1; 0; 0), (0; 1; 0), (1; 1; 0) do not
belong to P
1
i
, i = 1; 2. Take any b
i
2 B
i
such that b
i3
= 0 and take b
0
i
2 B
i
such that b
0
i1
= b
i1
,
b
0
i2
= b
i2
and b
0
i3
= 1. It is quite straightforward that, for all c
i
(h
1
) 2 
0
(B
j
) and for all q
i
2 Q
i
,
U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) < U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
). Indeed, the behaviors b
i
and b
0
i
give the same payos to
individual i against the opponent's behaviors b
j
with b
j3
= 0, but b
0
i
does strictly better than b
i
against the opponent's behaviors with b
j3
= 1.
Next it is shown that all b
i
2 B
i
with b
i3
= 1 belong to P
1
i
, i = 1; 2. For any b
i
with b
i3
= 1,
there exists c
i
(h
1
) 2 (B
j
) and q
i
2 Q
i
such that b
i
is the unique best response among B
i
. For
instance, the behavior b
i
= (1; 0; 1) is the unique best response against the belief q
i
= (
1
81
;
71
81
;
1
9
)
and the conjecture c
i
(h
1
) 2 (B
j
) such that
c
j
i
(h
1
)(b
j
) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
3
7
if b
j
= (1; 0; 0) or b
j
= (0; 0; 1)
1
7
if b
j
= (1; 1; 1)
0 otherwise
.
In Table 2 we give beliefs and conjectures against which each behavior b
i
with b
i3
= 1 is the
unique best response. By a continuity argument, see also Lemma 1 below, b
i
is also the unique
best response against the belief q
i
and a cautious conjecture that puts weight on all behaviors
b
j
2 B
j
. So, P
1
i
= f(0; 0; 1), (1; 0; 1), (0; 1; 1), (1; 1; 1)g, i = 1; 2.
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bi
b
j
(0; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 1; 1) (1; 1; 1)
(0; 0; 0) 0 0 0 0
(0; 0; 1)
3
4
3
7
3
7
1
3
(1; 0; 0) 0
3
7
0
1
3
(0; 1; 0) 0 0
3
7
1
3
(1; 1; 0) 0 0 0 0
(0; 1; 1) 0 0 0 0
(1; 0; 1) 0 0 0 0
(1; 1; 1)
1
4
1
7
1
7
0
q
i1
4
9
1
81
71
81
1
3
q
i2
4
9
71
81
1
81
1
3
q
i3
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
3
Table 2: Unique best response, conjecture and belief.
In the second iteration, individual i knows that individual j will play a behavior in P
1
j
.
Hence, for all c
i
(h
1
) 2 
0
(P
1
j
) and for all q
i
2 Q
i
, the unique best response of individual i is
the behavior b
i
= (0; 0; 1) which gives her a payo of 3. Indeed, for all c
i
(h
1
) 2 
0
(P
1
j
) and for
all q
i
2 Q
i
, any b
0
i
6= b
i
belonging to P
1
i
will give her a payo less than 3, because c
i
(h
1
) puts
positive probability on b
0
j
= b
0
i
and q
i
has full support. So, P
2
i
= f(0; 0; 1)g = P
1
i
, i = 1; 2, and
Z
1
(x
0
) = fx
3
g. In Example 6, the case with two individuals and three Pareto ranked moves, the
property of coalitional rationality is satised. There is a unique socially rationalizable outcome
and it is the Pareto-dominant one.
We show that the coalitional rationality property holds in general in the social environment
 

. In order to do so we use the following ve lemmas. Lemma 1 tells us that if a behavior
of individual i is the unique best response against a conjecture c
i
(possibly degenerate) and a
belief q
i
, then it is also the unique best response against some cautious conjecture c

i
and the
belief q
i
.
Lemma 1 Take any b
i
2 B
i
. If there exists q
i
2 Q
i
and c
i
such that (i) c
i
(h
1
) 2
Q
j 6=i
(B
j
)
and (ii) for all b
0
i
2 B
i
, b
0
i
6= b
i
, U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
), then there exists c

i
such that
(iii) c

i
(h
1
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(B
j
) and (iv) for all b
0
i
2 B
i
, b
0
i
6= b
i
, U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c

i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c

i
; q
i
).
Proof. Let c

i
be a conjecture that puts probability "=#B
j
on each behavior b
j
2 B
j
plus
(1   ") times the probabilities put by conjecture c
i
(h
1
) on the behaviors in B
j
; j 6= i: Then
c

i
(h
1
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(B
j
); and using that B
i
is a nite set, and that U
i
(h
1
) varies continuously with
"; it follows that " > 0 can be chosen small enough that U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c

i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c

i
; q
i
):
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Lemma 2 is useful to prove Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Lemma 2 Take y
1
; y
2
; y
3
; y
4
2 R
+
with y
2
; y
4
> 0: Then,
y
1
y
2
<
y
1
+ y
3
y
2
+ y
4
if and only if
y
1
y
2
<
y
3
y
4
.
Proof. Follows from a straightforward manipulation of the formula.
Lemma 3 tells us that any individual behavior b
i
such that individual i blocks the move to
x
N
(i.e. b
i
((x
0
x
N
; I) j h
1
) = 0) is never a best response whatever the conjecture c
i
and the
implementability prior-belief q
i
. Indeed, the behavior b
0
i
, where b
0
i
is the same as b
i
except that
individual i joins the move to x
N
, is always a strictly better response.
Lemma 3 Take any b
i
2 B
i
with b
iN
= 0. Take b
0
i
2 B
i
such that b
0
ik
= b
ik
for k = 1; :::; N   1
and b
0
iN
= 1. Then, U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) for all c
i
2
Q
j 6=i

0
(B
j
) and all q
i
2 Q
i
.
Proof. Consider any prole b
 i
2
Q
j 6=i
B
j
. Let f(b
 i
j h
1
) be the agreement set without
individual i, that is, all the moves after h
1
on which the opponents of individual i agree when
their behavior is b
 i
.
(i) For all b
 i
2
Q
j 6=i
B
j
and q
i
2 Q
i
, if (x
0
x
N
; I) =2 f(b
 i
j h
1
) then U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) =
U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
).
(ii) For all b
 i
2
Q
j 6=i
B
j
and q
i
2 Q
i
, if (x
0
x
N
; I) 2 f(b
 i
j h
1
) then
- if for every k such that b
ik
= 1 we have (x
0
x
k
; I) =2 f(b
 i
j h
1
) then 0 = U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) <
U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; b
 i
; q
i
),
- otherwise,
U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) =
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)2f(b
i
;b
 i
jh
1
)
u
i
(x
k
)  q
ik
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)2f(b
i
;b
 i
jh
1
)
q
ik
(=
y
1
y
2
)
and
U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) =
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)2f(b
i
;b
 i
jh
1
)
u
i
(x
k
)  q
ik
+ u
i
(x
N
)  q
iN
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)2f(b
i
;b
 i
jh
1
)
q
ik
+ q
iN
(=
y
1
+ y
3
y
2
+ y
4
);
since u
i
(x
N
) >
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)2f(b
i
;b
 i
jh
1
)
u
i
(x
k
)  q
ik
=
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)2f(b
i
;b
 i
jh
1
)
q
ik
, by Lemma 2 we have
U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; b
 i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; b
 i
; q
i
).
Hence, U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) for all c
i
2
Q
j 6=i

0
(B
j
) and all q
i
2 Q
i
.
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We introduce some additional notations. Given b
i
2 B
i
, let K
i
= #fk j b
ik
= 1g  N;
e(k) is the individual behavior such that the kth component is 1 and the other components
are 0, and 1 is the unit vector, that is, the behavior where the individual agrees to join every
move. Lemma 4 establishes that there exists a conjecture c
i
and an implementability belief
q
i
such that any behavior b
i
6= 1 where individual i agrees to move to x
N
is her unique best
response. This conjecture is such that it puts weight on b
j
= e(k) whenever b
ik
= 1 and on
b
j
= 1: The former part of the conjecture guarantees that b
i
gives higher utility than b
0
i
6= b
i
whenever b
0
i
blocks moves that are not blocked by b
i
: The latter part, together with a suitably
chosen implementability prior-belief, implies that b
i
outperforms any b
0
i
that agrees to strictly
more moves than b
i
:
Lemma 4 Take any b
i
2 B
i
n f1g such that b
iN
= 1. Then, for all b
0
i
2 B
i
(b
0
i
6= b
i
), we have
U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
); where c
i
(h
1
) 2
Q
j 6=i
(B
j
) is such that
c
j
i
(h
1
)(b
j
) =
8
>
<
>
:
u
i
(x
N
)  [K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)]
 1
if b
j
= e(k) and b
ik
= 1
u
i
(x
1
)  [K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)]
 1
if b
j
= 1
0 otherwise
and q
i
2 Q
i
is such that
q
ik
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
" if k = N
"
2
if b
ik
= 1 and k 6= N
(1  " 
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1;k 6=N
"
2
)  [#f(x
0
x
k
; I) j b
ik
= 0g]
 1
if b
ik
= 0
with 0 < "  (u
i
(x
N
)  u
i
(x
N 1
))  [N  u
i
(x
N 1
)]
 1
.
Proof. Let p(f(b
 i
j h
1
)) be the probability the opponents of individual i agree on f(b
 i
j h
1
).
Notice that f(b
 i
j h
1
) could be empty. Then,
p(M(h
1
)) =
Y
j 6=i
u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)
;
p(f(b
 i


h
1
)) = 0 if #f(b
 i
j h
1
)  2 and f(b
 i
j h
1
) 6=M(h
1
),
p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g) =
Y
j 6=i
u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)
 
Y
j 6=i
u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)
if b
ik
= 1,
and p(f(x
0
x
0
; ;g) is the remainder. The probability p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g) follows from the observation
that the agreement set is f(x
0
x
k
; I)g if and only if all opponents of i choose e(k) or 1; and not
all of them choose 1: Then,
U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) =
X
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g)  u
i
(x
k
)
+

u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)

#I 1
2
6
4
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
q
ik
3
7
5
.
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Two cases have to be considered. In Case 1 we consider b
0
i
such that, for some k, b
ik
= 1 and
b
0
ik
= 0. In Case 2 we take b
0
i
6= b
i
such that b
ik
= 1 implies b
0
ik
= 1.
Case 1. Since p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g) = 0 if b
ik
= 0, and there is k such that b
ik
= 1 and b
0
ik
= 0, it
follows that
U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) 
X
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g)  u
i
(x
k
)  p(f(x
0
x
1
; I)g)  u
i
(x
1
)
+

u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)

#I 1
2
6
6
4
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
0
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
0
ik
=1
q
ik
3
7
7
5
.
Since

u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)

#I 1
2
6
6
4
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
0
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
0
ik
=1
q
ik
3
7
7
5


u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)

#I 1
 u
i
(x
N
),
and

u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)

#I 1
 u
i
(x
N
) <
(u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
))
#I 1
  (u
i
(x
1
))
#I 1
(K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
))
#I 1
 u
i
(x
1
)
which equals p(f(x
0
x
1
; I)g)u
i
(x
1
), it follows that U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) <
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g)
u
i
(x
k
). Hence, U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
).
Case 2. It holds that
U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) =
X
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
p(f(x
0
x
k
; I)g)  u
i
(x
k
) +

u
i
(x
1
)
K
i
 u
i
(x
N
) + u
i
(x
1
)

#I 1

2
6
6
4
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
) +
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=0;b
0
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
q
ik
+
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=0;b
0
ik
=1
q
ik
3
7
7
5
.
Since b
0
ik
= 1 while b
ik
= 0 for some k  N   1 (and b
iN
= 1), we have
(
y
3
y
4
=)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=0;b
0
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=0;b
0
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
N 1
).
Also, notice that
(
y
1
y
2
=)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
q
ik
 u
i
(x
k
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
q
ik
=
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1;k 6=N
"
2
 u
i
(x
k
) + "  u
i
(x
N
)
P
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1;k 6=N
"
2
+ "
>
"u
i
(x
N
)
N"
2
+ "
=
u
i
(x
N
)
N"+ 1
.
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Since, by denition of "; 0 < "  (u
i
(x
N
)  u
i
(x
N 1
))  [N  u
i
(x
N 1
)]
 1
, we have
y
1
y
2
>
u
i
(x
N
)
N"+ 1
 u
i
(x
N 1
) 
y
3
y
4
.
Hence, by Lemma 2 it follows that U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
).
The next lemma shows that the behavior where i agrees to join every move is individually
rational.
Lemma 5 Take b
i
2 B
i
such that b
ik
= 1, k = 1; :::; N . Then, for all b
0
i
2 B
i
(b
0
i
6= b
i
) and for
all q
i
2 Q
i
, we have U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) > U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
); where c
i
(h
1
) 2
Q
j 6=i
(B
j
) is such that
c
j
i
(h
1
)(b
j
) =
(
1
N
if b
j
= e(k), k = 1; :::; N
0 otherwise
.
Proof. For b
i
= 1, we have
U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) 
X
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
u
i
(x
k
) 

1
N

#I 1
  u
i
(x
1
) 

1
N

#I 1
<
X
(x
0
x
k
;I)jb
ik
=1
u
i
(x
k
) 

1
N

#I 1
= U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) 8b
0
i
6= b
i
, 8q
i
2 Q
i
:
Putting these results together, we are able to show the following main result.
Theorem 3 Consider the social environment  

: There is a unique behavior of individual i that
is socially rationalizable, P
1
i
= fe(N)g; i 2 I:
Proof. By Denition 5, P
0
i
= B
i
and P
0
=
Q
i2I
B
i
. In the rst iteration, by Lemma 3, all
b
i
2 P
0
i
such that b
iN
= 0 do not belong to P
1
i
, i 2 I. By Lemma 1, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5,
all b
i
such that b
iN
= 1 belong to P
1
i
, i 2 I. So, P
1
i
= fb
i
j b
iN
= 1g i 2 I:
In the second iteration, for all c
i
(h
1
) 2
Q
j 6=i

0
(P
1
j
) and for all q
i
2 Q
i
, the behavior b
i
such
that b
iN
= 1 and b
ik
= 0 if k 6= N gives to individual i a utility U
i
(h
1
)(b
i
; c
i
; q
i
) = u
i
(x
N
). How-
ever, for all b
0
i
2 P
1
i
nfb
i
g, U
i
(h
1
)(b
0
i
; c
i
; q
i
) < u
i
(x
N
) for all c
i
and all q
i
, because for some k < N;
b
0
ik
= 1; and the cautiousness of c
i
implies that with positive probability the opponents of i have
an agreement set f(x
0
x
k
; I)g; which leads to utility u
i
(x
k
) < u
i
(x
N
): So, P
2
i
= fe(N)g = P
1
i
;
i 2 I:
The above result implies that social rationalizability satises the property of coalitional
rationality. When the outcomes can be Pareto ranked, a coalition selects the Pareto-dominant
25
outcome. Each individual only agrees to move to the Pareto dominating outcome, and blocks
all other moves.
Corollary 1 Consider the social environment  

. We have Z
1
(x
0
) = fx
N
g.
5 Conclusion
Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents
interact in a society. We have argued for the need of a new solution concept for social envi-
ronments that is based on individual rationality, called social rationalizability. One of the basic
steps in our construction is to model individual behavior in a social environment, which makes
a social environment apt to an analysis based on individual rationality. Individual behavior
within a coalition is modeled as the decision to agree to a coalitional move or to block it. Since
a coalition may have several moves available, and more than one coalition may have the option
to move at the same time, there can be many moves on which there is agreement. Individuals
therefore also form beliefs on which move in the set of moves on which there is agreement will
be carried out.
Social rationalizability identies which coalitions are likely to form and which outcomes
might occur when (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses,
and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. We have shown that for all social
environments the set of socially rationalizable outcomes is non-empty. The computation of the
set of socially rationalizable outcomes is greatly simplied by using a reduction procedure, which
we show to be equivalent to the formal denition of social rationalizability.
Social rationalizability aims to be a weak concept that rules out with condence. Its non-
emptiness makes it applicable to cases where traditional solution concepts fail to make predic-
tions. It is also not too weak in the sense that it satises individual rationality. As a theory
of social behavior, social rationalizability should also be consistent with elementary notions of
coalitional rationality. For instance, when a coalition has to choose between a number of Pareto
ranked moves, it should select the Pareto dominating one for sure. It is shown that social
rationalizability is consistent with coalitional rationality.
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